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I.Introduction
The implications of uncertainty for cost-benefit analysis remain con-
troversial. Two related problems are the subject of this analysis. First,
for any given future period a dollar magnitude must be identified which
appropriatelyrepresents the value of the uncertain benefits (costs) to
accrue in thatyear.Second, an appropriate discount rate for converting
this future value into present value mustbeidentified.
For illustrative purposes consider a simple problem. The construction
of a damisbeing considered. Potential benefits include flood control in
wetyears and theprovision of irrigation water in dryyears. A standard
approachto determining the value of this darn employs the probabilities of
wet and dry years together with the value of benefits to accrue under each
circumstance to calculate the expected value (mathematicalexpectation)
of benefits in each year. Thus, for exarnile, if therewere two possible
states of nature within a given year——"wet" and "dry" with probabilities
.7 and .3 respectively, and if a particular farmer werewilling to pay up
to $50 for the darn ifa wet year were certainand upto $100 if a dry year
werecertain, then $65 would be counted as the value of benefits accruing
to the farmer in the given year. Adding across affected individualswould
then yield the total benefit for the year.
Having obtained a measure of the total value of the darn within each
year, the standard approach then involves discounting thesebenefits to—2—
obtainthe present value, with the discount rates to be selected so as to
appropriately reflect the riskiness of the benefits. Needless to say,
therehas beenconsiderable controversyregarding the appropriate dis-
count rate.1
In addition to the debate regarding the discount rate there has
recently surfaced a second controversy regarding the use of expected
value as a measure of benefit within a period. If thefarmerin the
example were willing to pay $50 for thedamcontingentupon the occur—
enceof the state "wet" and $100 contingent upon "dry"whatis the
maximum sure payment that he would be willing to make in both states?
FollowingBurton Weisbrod(1964) the term "option price" has been used
todescribe this maximum sure payment. Millard Long (1967) asserted
that option price is nothing more than the expected value of surplus or
$65 in our example. Cotton Lindsay (1969) disagreed and Charles J.
Cicchetti and A. Myrick Freeman III (1971) and then John Krutilla et al
(1972) argued that option price should generally exceed the expected
valueof surplus so thatinour example thefarmershould be willing to
pay more than $65 to insure the availability of the dam. More recently,
Richard Schmalensee (1972)and Claude Henry (1974) haveshown that option
pricedepends upon individual preferences andmay eitherexceed orbe less
than the expected value of surplus. This result is, of course, trouble-
some for the analyst wishing to employ cost-benefit analysis. Having
available estimates of the expected value of surplus for the farmer as
well ashisoption price, which number is to be used as a measure of his
LSee,for example, thediscussionin Arrow andLind(1970).—3—
benefitfor the period? To what extent does the answer to thisquestion
affect the choice of the appropriate discount rate?
Inwhat follows we provide aconceptually correct procedure for
determiningwhether a risky project passes the "potential Pareto
improvement" welfare criterion which forms the normative basis ofcost—
benefit analysis. In this approach the role ofsecondary markets in
providing opportunities for redistributing risk is madetransparent and
the modificationsnecessary when such markets do not exist are suggested.
Some of the more interesting results include:
(1)Option price is the appropriate measure of benefit in
situationsinvolving similar individuals and collective
risk.
(2) Expected value calculations areappropriateto situations
involving similar individuals and individual risks.
(3) Whether or not option price exceeds theexpected value of
surplusis largelyirrelevantto theevaluation of risky
projects.
(4) In a wide range of circumstances,including incomplete
markets, discounting for risky projects should be done
at the riskiess rate.
2. The Willingness to Pay tciis
Togain insightinto theappropriate measure ofuncertainbenefits
within a given period we shall continue theexample of the dam. To make
matters more precise suppose there are twogoods the first of which will—4—
be called "dollars" while the second is the proposed darn. As before there
aretwo possiblestates of nature, "wet" and"dry"with probabilities .7
and.3,respectively. Followingthestate preference approach of Arrow
(1964)we suppose thatthefarmer is endowed with claims to the first
good contingent upon whichstateoccurs; e dollars to be received if
"wet"occurs and eD dollars if"dry."Using the von Neuman—Morgenstern
theorem as extended by Hirshleifer (1965) the farmer's utility function
can be represented as
U=.7Uw(cw,6)+.3UD(cD,6)
wherec and CD represent claims to dollars contingent upon "wet" and "dry,"
respectively, and 6depictsthe availability of the dam (6=1indicates
that the services of the dam are available to the farmer under specified
termsand 6 =0indicatesthat they are not).
Thestandardassumutions are made that




RiskAversion: U' Cc.,, 6) 1 < 0 i =W,
2.1 2
2Thereseems to besomeconfusion in the literature regarding the meaning
of the term risk—aversion; see, for example, Schmalensee (1972), p. 815.
Theassumptionas stated is sufficient to assure that thefarmerwould de-
cline any fair, independent gamble. Suppose, for example, that given his
endowment eieDhe were given the chance to make any fair bet he wished on
thetoss of a (fair) coin. Supposing the outcome of thecointoss tobe
(continuedon nextpage)—5—
The terns "expected surplus" and "option price" may nowbemade precise.
Define S, i =W,D by the requirement
(1) U (e —Si,1) —U(e', 0) i —W,D
Then the expected value of surplus is
(2) E (Si) .7 Sw +.3
SD
2 (concluded)
distributedindependently of the states "wet" and "dry" we have four states:
"wet" and heads," "wet and tails," etc. Let the bet pay x if heads and y if
tailswith.5x +.5y=0,then the utility of accepting the gamble is
UE •7(.5U(e+x,ä) +.SU(e+y*5)]
+ .3 (.5 UD (eD +x,6)+.5%(e+y,6)]
whilethe utility of declining the betis
.7 U (e ,6)+.3UD (eD '
Butriskaversion andx,y I0implythat
.5 Ui (e +x,*5)+.5Ui Ce. +y,5) <U.(er 6)
i =W,D
Thus U <Uand the bet would be declined. On the other hand, gambles which
arenotindependent of existing risks affordthe individual an opportunity
tobuy insurance. It would surely be a misnomer to define risk aversion
in a way that requires an individual to refuse the chance to buy fair in-
surance against an existing risk and yet this is the definition Schmalensee
proposes.—
Optionprice, on the other hand, is defined by the requirement:
(3) .7 U (e
—OP,1) + .3 UD (eD —OP,1) =
.7
(en,0) +.3 %(en,0) U
Optionvalue is defined as the difference
(4) OV OP —E(S.1
We may now introduce a concept which willprove crucial to subsequent
analysis.The "willingness to pay locus" consists of ordered pairs
w satisfying
(5) .7 U (e —' U +.3U (eDTD' 1)
where U is defined in equation (3). By construction, the farmer would as
soon make any of the contingent payments for the dam as do without
it. Notice, moreover, that the previously defined magnitufes SD and OP





is one point on the locus and
W' =(0?,OP)—7—
is another. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The concavity which is illus-
trated for the locus follows directly from the assumption of risk aversion.
Afurther point along the locus which might be called the "certainty
point" may be identified for expository purposes. Let(-y, y) be that
pointonthe locus satisfying3
(6) U (e —'r, 1) UD (eD —'' 1)
Were the farmer to contract for these contingent payments for the dam he
would be indifferent as to which state of nature occurs. Put somewhat
differently,he wouldhave,in the process of contracting for these
contingentpayments, simultaneously acquired a completely insured position
against the uncertain state of nature.
A related reference point on the locus may be labeled the "fair bet"
point and defined by the requirement that(y, y) belong to the locus
4 andsatisfy
3This existence of thispoint is assured by continuity of the willing-
ness to pay locus, f ('y), together with the assumption
0 (0, 1) ..tID(eD —f(e),
U (e1 —f1(eD). 1] (0, 1)
4The fair betpoint corresponds to that point where the absolute value
















(7) U <e — 1) U Ce0 — 1)
Precise relationships among the surplus, certainty and fair bet points are
developed in an appendix; here it is sufficient to point out that in gen-
eral these are distinct points along thewillingnessto pay locus.
3. ption Value
The willingness to pay locus canbeused to indicate the factors
determining whether option value (equation (4)] is positive or negative.
The possibilities are illustrated in Figures 2a—c.Figure 2a is charac-
terized by the fact that the fair bet point lies to the right of the 45°
line. Since the slope of the locus at this point gives the relative
probability of "wet" versus "dry," a parallel throughthesurplus point
4 (concluded)
d'rD .7 U (e - 1)
.3 U (eD — 1)
=—
Nowthe locusis only defined for and eD since negative
consumptjoris are not defined. Thus, in general there may be no actual
tangencyofthe locus to a line shose slope represents the relative
probabilities of the states but only a"corner solution." Insuch cir—















S yields all payment combinations with the sameexpectedvalue as thesur-
pluspoint. Where this line crosses the 450 line payments are equalin
bothstates andthus alsoequal to the expected value of surplus. Here
option price necessarily exceeds the expected value of surplusand thus
optionvalue is positive.
In Figure 2b the fair bet point lies to the left of the surpluspoint
anda similarconstruction reveals that, in this case, the expected value
of surplus must exceed option price yielding a negative option value.
The third case illustrated in Figure 2c is characterizedby the fair
bet point lying between the 45° line and the surplus point.Here there
is ambiguity: option price may be greater or less than theexpected value
of surplus.
4. The Potential Pareto Irthrovement Test
Figures 2a—2c not only summarize the considerations affecting the
sign of option value, they also suggest that theremay be little to
recommend either option price or expected surplus for a role ofprominence
in cost—benefit analysis. They are, after all,only twoarbitrarilyse-
lected pointsalong the willingness to pay locus and have no obvious claim
topreference over other points along the locus including the fair betand
certainty points. The question to be resolved ultimately is whetheror
not there exist payments for each individual which, whenaggregated,yield
sufficient resources to build the dam and which, whencoupled with the
provision of the dam, leave no individual worseoffthen he would othexwjse
havebeen. This question can beanswered as follows. Having developed










thatthere are N people in the society and that the willingness to pay locus
of the th person is given by
—fi(y) i —1,...,N
Themethod of aggregating these curves is illustrated in Figure 3 and
will immediately be recognized as analogous to the "community indifference
curve" construction from international trade theory. The curve labeled
wtp1is drawnrelativeto an origin at and represents the willingness
topay locus of the first person. Similarly wt2 is drawn relative to an
origin at 02, and represents the locus of the second person. 02 is posi-
tioned relative to 01 so that (1) the two curves will be tangent and (2)
2
the respective axesareparallel. The curve labeledEwtp1 represents i=l
the locus of all such possible positions for 02 and can be interpreted as
the set of maximum payments that the first two individualswould collec-
tively make for the dam.5Noticethat the slope of the aggregate curve
at a given point is the same as the slope of the individual curves at the
associated tangency point.
5Alternatively,let r be defined as the set of payments lying on or be-
.th low the iperson'swillingness to pay locus. By assumption r. is convex
for all i. The aggregate willingness to pay locus is obtained as the upper
boundaryofthe sum of these sets, Z ='i,y c r.i—i, ...,N).
Itis well knownthatthe sum of convex sets is itself convex; thus the






Tothis aggregate locus for the first twopeopleis "added" the locus
forthe third individual and so forth obtaining in the end the aggregate
locus for the entire society illustrated in Figure 4. The point labeled
V is the maximum sure payment that society as a whole would be willing to
make for the dam and represents the magnitude that should be compared with
a sure resource cost of building the dam. Should the cost of the dam it-
self be uncertain no appreciable difficulty is added.If, for example,
the cost is to be ain the state "wet" aridaD in the state "dry," then
the dam shouldbebuilt on the potential Pareto imnrovement criterion
since reference to Figure 4 indicates that society would be willing to
sacrifice resources sufficient to cover actual costsin each possible
state.(There are points on the aggregate locus to the northeast of A.)
Onthe other hand,if resource costs are described by a point such as B
which lies above theaggregate locus then there does not exist a Pareto
improvingwayof providing the dam.
It should benotedthat ifanaggregate payment such as Vwere
actually to be collected with each person making a payment along his own
willingnessto pay locus, than a Pareto efficient distribution of risk
would result. To see this notice firstthatthe slope of the aggregate
locusat V is the same as the slope of each individual' s locus at the
implied paymentspoint. Butthe slope of an individual's willingness to
pay locus at a particular payments point is equal to his marginal rate of
substitution between the two goods once the payments are contracted.Thus
the marginal rates of substitutionbetween "dollars ifwet" and "dollars
if dry" are equated for all individuals. Such a taxation scheme,therefore,












claimsagainstthe twostateswith relative prices equal to thecoiimion mar-
gina]. rate of substitution.
This,then,is the general answerregardingwhich of the points along
the individual'swillingness to pay locus is relevant to cost—benefit
analysis. For each possible pair of contingent claimspricesfor the two
states,select that payment combination for each individualwhichhas the
greatest valueat these prices. Adding these payments across individuals
yieldsa point ontheaggregate willingness to pay locus. Justification
of theproject hinges upon the question of whether or notcontingent
pricesexist at which aggregate willingness topay in each state exceeds
thecorresponding resource cost of the project. Should suchprices exist
that point from an individual's locus which hasthe greatest value at
these prices is theone relevant for cost—benefit analysis andthe cor-
responding value at these prices is the appropriatemeasure of benefit.
5. pecial Cases
It remainstodetermine whether option price or expected valuecal-
culations have any potential relevance tocost—benefit analysis. Consider
first a special case in which (1) theresource cost of the dam is certain
and (2) all individuals are alike-—sameutility functions and same endowed
claims. Here we are concerned with theintersection of the aggregate
locus with the 45° line (point V inFigure 4) since this point represents
the largest possible surepayment. But with all individuals alike this
aggregate payment entails each individualmakinga paymentcorresPonding
to the intersection of his individualwillingness to pay locus with the
450line.This payment, nreover, is simply theindividual's option— 13—
price.With individuals alike the initial distribution ofrisk is efficient
andcollecting the sure,option—pricepayment from each preserves this
efficiency.Thusthere exist circumstances in which option price is the
appropriatemeasureofbenefit.
Thesecond type of special case to be consideredinvolves the concept
of"individual risks" discussed by Nalinvaud (1973). The dam problem in-
volves a "collective risk" since everyone will experience the state "wet"
or everyone will experience the state "dry." Consider an alternative
situation based upon an example from Schmalensee (1972). Here an individ-
ual can be in one of two "individual states." In the first he will have
"a strong desire" to go to Yellowstone Park next. summer. In the second
he will have no desire to go. What is different about this situation is
that it is possible for one person to experience "individual state 1"
while another experiences "individual state 2."
It is possible, of course, to place this problem within the original
framework by identifying states of nature according to the experience of
each individual. Thus "state 1" might correspond to the situation in which
each of the N members of society experiences "individual state 1."
Similarly,"state 2"mightdenote the case in which everyone except theNth
person experiences "individualstate 1" while the Nth experiences "individ-
ual state 2." Byexpressing each person's willingness to pay locus in terms
ofcontingent dollarclaims against each of the 2Npossible states itis
possibleto proceed exactly as before.
A considerable simplificationis oossible, however, if we assume (1)
againthat individuals are alike and have the same endowments (thesame
"individual state 1" and "individualstate 2"utility functions and the— 14—
sameendowed claims to dollars contingentupon these individual states)
and(2)that the probability distribution of states takesa particular
form.For simplicity suppose that N is large and thatthe probability
can betaken to be one that a total of .3N individuals willbe in
"individual state 1" in a given period and.7Nwill be in "individual
state2" While itis known with certainty what fractions ofsociety
will experience the alternative individualstates, the fates of par-
ticular individuals areuncertain.6For anygivenperson we simply
suppose that the probability that he will be in "individualstate 1"
is .3whilethe probability of "individualstate 2" is.7.Thewilling-
ness to pay locus of a representative individual isillustrated in
Figure 5. The surplus point S indicates that theindividual would be
willing to pay up to $100 above the costs of thetrip for a visit to
Yellowstone if he were certain of "individualstate 1" and nothing if
"individual state 2" were certain. Thisyields an expected surplusof
$30.
As previously mentioned thediscussion in Schmalensee (1972)
focusesupon whether or not the individual's option priceexceeds $30.
Here we will, be concerned with the imolicationsof individual risks.
The fair bet point (labeled fb inFigure 5) represents that point where
the slope of the locus equals (inabsolute value) the odds of being in
"individual state 1." The tangentto the locus at this point, then,









representsalternative payment combinations with the same expected value.
Sinceindividuals are alike each is willing to makepayments ofOa "Sif
individual,state 1" andOb"S if individual state 2." The expected value
of these payments is OV for each person.Moreover, since itis known
that.3N individuals will experience "individual state 1" while .7N
will experience "individual state 2" theaggregate payment resulting
fromthese individual payments would be
.3N.Qa+.7N.Ob=(.3•Oa+.7.ob)N
=OV•N
Thusitis possible to collect an aggregate surepayment equal to Ntimes
theexpected value of the fair bet point. Since no largersure payment
ispossible, the&. fair bet point may, in these circumstances, beidentified
as the one appropriate to cost-benefit analysis.Alternatively, the ex-
pected value of the fair bet point is the appropriatemeasure of benefit.
This special case is an illustration ofa more general proposition
developed by Malirwaud (1973) which indicates circumstancesin which
equilibrium prices for contingent dollar claimsagainst alternative states
tendto beequal to the probabilities of the states. Thesimplified pro-
cedure followed in this case is madepossible, in essence, by the knowledge
that prices equal to the probabilities ofthe individual states will yield
an efficient distribution of risk. Reference toFigure 5 indicates that
this case is further characterized by the factthat the expected value of
surplus, $30, is greater than option priceand, therefore, option value— 16—
isnegative. It would obviously be easy to illustrate a case in which
option value is positive simply by drawing the willingness to pay locus
so that it crosses the 45° line above $30. The signofoption value is,
however, irrelevant. If expected values are relevant at all, i.e., if
the situation involves individual—insurable risks, then the expected
valueof the fair bet point is the largest of all points along the locus
and is,therefore, the appropriate measure of benefit. If thesituation
doesnot involve individual—insurable risks then prices which support an
efficient allocation of contingent claims will not in general be equal
to probabilities and expected values have no bearing upon the appropriate
"market price" value.7
To restate, if individuals are alike then option price measures
benefit in cases of collective risk while expected willingness to pay
(the expected value of the fairbet point) measures benefit in cases
ofindividual-insurable risks.
6. Second Best Considerations
The"hypotheticalcompensation test" of Kaldor—Hicks and Scitovsky
is the normative basis of cost—benefit analysis as it isnormally applied.
Inthis approach it is sufficient for thejustificationof a project that
7Estimatesof option price and the expected value of surplus may, of
course, be used as lower bounds for the expected value of the fair bet
point. It shouldbenoted in this regard that an estimate of consumer
surplus (the Hicksian compensating variation) derived from demand data
forYellowstone visitors would ideally estimate the expected value of
surplus.To see this note thatsince .3N individualsvisit the park
eachperiod with each having a surplus of $100, one would obtain $30N,
the aggregate expected value of surplus, from an ideal "area under the
demandcurve"type calculation. Since this measure is a lower bound
forthe true value Krutilla et al (1972)were correct in their
suspicionthat expected surplusunderstates the true benefit.— 17—
aset of payments be identified for a project which (1) individuals would
willingly makeforthe project rather than do without itand (2)cover
theactual costs of the project. It is not co=only required that a
taxation scheme be identified which collects from each individual pay-
mentsconmensurate with hiswillingness to pay. Thus actual financing
ofa justifiable project may collect an amountexceeding benefits from
someindividuals andan amountlessthanbenefits from others. In such
cases itis simply argued that the winners could, in principle, compen-
sate the losers.
The issue of the actual method of financing a project assumes a
more crucial role in cases of uncertainty for reasonswhich will soon
beapparent. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 6. Here a
society consisting of twopeople(who face a collective risk regarding
the occurence of state 1 or state 2) is willing to makean aggregate
surepayment corresponding to point Cfor a particular project.
Suppose that actualfinancingof the project entails a sure collection
of D from each.(C =2D).This yields a surprising situation in which
both people are worse off than they would have been without the project
since D exceeds the option price of each person. The difftculty stems
from the fact that being willing to make an aggregate payment of C is
predicated upon achieving an efficient distribution of risk. Collecting
payments corresponding to A andB, respectively, from thefirst and
second people equates their marginalratesof substitution between
"$ifstate 1" and "$ifstate 2 andis,therefore, consistent with














otherhand, does not equate marginal rates of substitution andisincon-
sistent withefficiency unless secondary markets are available in which
the individuals can buy and sell contingent clng.
The case of independent risks poses similar problems.Looking
backat Figure 5 we see that both expected willingness to pay, V, and
expectedsurplus exceed optionprice. Should actual financing entail
sure collections of either Vor $30 from each individual, everyone
wouldbe a loser in that situation as well unless a secondary market
for insurance exists.
It is implicit in the original discussions of the "hypothetical
compensation test" that complete markets exist for all goods. One
need not beconcerned withthe allocational efficiency of taxation
schemes in such curcuimstances since trade in the perfect secondary
markets assures ultimate allocational efficiency. However appropriate
this "complete markets" assumption was for the riskless world of these
original debates, it is generally conceded that many of the contingent
claimsmarketsrequired for allocational efficiency in a risky world
do not exist.8 It is crucialinsuch circumstances that either (1) the
particularmethod of financingthe project be evaluated with respect to
its implications for the distribution of risk or (2) theanalysis be
modified in such a way as to avoid dependence on non-existingmarkets.
8Thereare at least twoimportant reasonswhy many types of contingent claims markets do not exist. The first is moral hazard: aperson buying claimscontingent uton a particular state may haveincentivesto alter
his behavior in a way that is adverse to the seller. Second, suchmar-
kets require complicated and specializedcontracts which maybe costly
both towrite andtoenforce.— 19—
Theproblem canbeput rather simply. The magnitudecorrespondingto C
in Figure 6 represents society's willingness to pay for twothings:(1)
the project itself and(2)an efficient allocation of risk. If the
method of financing the project yields an efficient allocation it is
legitimate to use C as a measure of total benefit. If, on the other
hand, the financing scheme does not produce efficiency then collecting
Camounts tocharging society for a benefit that hasnotbeen produced.9
Forthese reasons option price may be regarded as a "second—best" measure
of benefit appropriate to situations in which(1)actual financing in-
volvessure collections from individuals and(2) secondarycontingent
claims markets arenotavailable.
7.Discountingfor Time andRisk
Themodifications required to introduce time into the analysis are
straightforward. In the case of the dam consider nowatwo period
situation in which the services of the darnwillbe available at the
beginning of the second period andsimultaneouslyit will be discovered
whether the second period is to be "wet" or "dry." For simplicity
91t might be thought thatstate—dependent collections represent an un-
realistic method of financing projects. This is not necessarily true,
however. In the case of the darn, for example, a combination of sure
taxes and water chargesmight produce exactly thecombination of contingent
paymentsrequired for allocational efficiency. Sure taxesandvisitor
charges might similarly be used in thecase of Yellowstone Park. InFigure
5asure taxofOb in both states plus a visitor charge of Oa—Ob would produce
exactlythe desired result. In general, however, the same factors that
prevent contingent claims markets from being privately organized would pre—
sably inhibit the useofstate—dependent collection schemes.— 20—
supposethere is no uncertainty regarding the first period. The first
good, dollars, may nowbetakentoform three elementary commodities:
(1) sure dollars for consumption during the first period, (2) dollars
for consumption in the second period contingent upon the occurence of
"wet"and (3) second period dollars contingent upon "dry." Supposing
the individual to have a utility function representing his preferences
for consumption programs involving these three goods and theproposed
damand supposing that he is endowed with claims against the three
types of state/timedependent dollars, we may illustrate his willing-
nessto pay locus in Figure 7.
Byaggregating these loci across individuals in the mannersug-
gested earlier one obtains the aggregate willingness to pay locus. As
before theproject is justifiable if the vectordescribing its resource
costs lies below this aggregate surface. If, for example, all costs
areto beincurred during the first period thenthe relevant measure
of benefit is the intersection of theaggregatesurface withthe
"$inperiod1" axis.
Asin the timelesscase this construction supposes either that (1)
competitive markets exist for the three types of dollar claimsor that
(2)the method of financing the project involves time andstatedepend-
ent payments compatible with an efficient allocation. In either case
discounting is done implicitly at a riskiess rate. This may be shown
asfollows. At the payments points associated with an efficient collec-
tion scheme the marginal rate of substitution between any twotypesof
dollars is the same for all individuals. Thus relative "shadow prices"
for the three types of dollars aredetermined.By choosing "$in— Oa —









period1" as numeraire (by letting its price eaua]. one) we cansolve
uniquely for p and asthe prices (in terms of sure period 1 dol—
•lars) of claims paying one dollar in period 2 if "wet" occurs andone
dollar in period 2 if"dry"occurs, respectively. Since one canpur-
chaseat these prices claims assuring a sure dollar in period 2 at a
cost of +inperiod 1 dollars, it follows that the riskiess dis-





invested in period 1 atrate r returns one sure dollar inpe-
riod 2). Now suppose an individual is willing to make payments of
(a, bs bD) in the three types of dollar claims. The present value
(the value in terms of period 1 dollars) of this payments rograxn is
Va+pWbW+PDbD
Alternatively, the value of period 2 payments in terms of sure period 2
dollars is
b W PW+PD D
which implies that
1 pwbw+PDbD
1 b + + = wbw +DbD— 22—
orthat
Va+ b 1+ r
The caseofindividual-insurable risk illustrated in the Yellowstone
Park example again represents an interesting special case. By making the
analogous modification to two periods and adopting the obvious notation
the relative price p1/p2 will in this case equal the relative probabilities
of state 1 versus state 2. Here the present value of a payments program
is obtained by discounting the expected value of period 2 payments at the
riskiess rate corresponding to
1 =p+p l+r 1 2








.7 probability of state 2— 23—






Eexpectedvalue of (b1, b2)
Second best considerations remain crucial in the temporal case. A
method appropriate to cases of incomplete markets and sure collection
schemes can be illustrated with an example. In the case of the dam,
supposethat a market exists in which individuals can exchangeperiod 1
dollarsand sure period two dollars. On the other hand, no markets for
trade in claims contingent upon the occurence of "wet" or "dry" exist.
Although the individual depicted in Figure 7 is prepared to make any of
the payments combinations along his willingness to pay surface the
available market only allows payments lying within the plane determined
by the "$inperiod 1" axis and the 450linelying between the "$in
period 2 if wet" and the "$inperiod 2 if dry" axes. That portion of
his willingness to pay surface which lies in this plane is relevant to




itis possible to aggregate the willingness to pay schedules of iridivid—
ualsto obtain the aggregate locus depicted in Figure 9 for the case of
two individuals.Here the maximum payment that society wouldwillingly
makefor the dam in period 1 dollarsisgiven by 01 02. Implicit in this
aggregate payment is the fact thatthefirstindividual"borrows" an
amount01a from the second at the riskless rate corresponding to
1+rtane
Equivalently, the present value of benefits for each individual is computed
by discounting his willingness to pay at this riskiess rate. Notice that
thisanalysis in no way assumes theexistence of markets allowing trade
incontingent claims. Discounting at the riskless rate is the direct con-
sequence of theexistence of a market for exchange of riskiess clairns)0
10The matter ofdiscounting for risk may beclarified by a complete mar- ketexample. Suppose there are S states with iT denoting the objective
probability of state s. Complete contingent claims markets exist with
PS
the current price of a claim to one dollar in period two contingent unori
the occurence of s. The riskiess discount rate is then 1/Cl + r)E p.
Suppose now that ownership of an asset, a, entails claims to a dollars in
period two if state s occurs s =1,...,5.The current marke price of
this asset must be V =Zp a .Thismarket value may also be calculated $ S S
by determining the value of the asset in period two sure dollars
Z (p /E p.) aand then discounting at the riskiess rate s Sj 3$
V 1/Cl +r) Z (p /Z p.) a
$Si 3S
= E (/Z p.) a
=Epa$55







Theapproachto theillustrativecases examined thus far mayeasily
begeneralized to situations involving an arbitrary numberofperiods
and states. Consider a general situation involving S states andQ+1
periods andsupposethat markets exist inwhich individuals can exchange
current sure (time zero)dollars for M different types ofassets. 0iner-





dollarsat time q (the end of period q) if state s occurs. For nota-
tional conveniencelet current sure dollars be that asset indexedby zero.
A portfolio, then, is anM + 1 tuple,x, where the ith..coxrponent, x,de-
notes the quantity of the ith asset, i —0,...,N.Roldingthe portfolio
10 (concluded)
Now ifone wished to discount the expected value of periodtwo claims
ratherthan their truesecond—periodmarket value then one wouldre-
quire theriskydiscount ratecorresponding to
1/(1 +p)E w a —Zp a V s s
If market prices were proportional to probabilities, P1/Ps for
all i,j, then i— p/Z p and o— r.In general, however, market S sji
pricesare not proportional to probabilities and o'r.In such circum-
stances the useofp represents nothingmorethanacorrection factor
for having used probabilities rather than prices to measure the future
valueof receipts.— 26—
xthus entities the owner to x0 current sure dollars andclaimspaying
M s—i, ...,S txa
i—ii sq q —1,•,•Q
dollarsat time q if state s occurs. In vector notation we have
C— Ax
where
1 0 0 ...0
3. 2 N o
a11a11... a11
1 2 M o
a21a21... a21
1 2 N o
aSQa... aSQ
and c is the SQ +1vector of time—state detendent dollar claims associated
with the portfolio x.
Theutility function of the individual for consumption programs in-
volving the SQ +1possible types of time—state dependent claims, TJ(c),
can beused to derive a utility functionfor portfolios by defining the— 27—
utilityof the portfolio to be equal to the utility of the associated
vector of time—state dependent claims:U
u(x) U(Ax)
Similarly,if the list of goodsis expanded toinclude the services
to be derived from a proposed public project, then the notation u(x, cS)
may be usedtodenote the utility of holding the portfolio x when the
services areprovided (61) andwhen the services are not provided
(6 =0).Supposing the individual to be endowed, following market trade,
with the portfolio e the willingness to pay locus may be defined as con-
sisting of those vectors y which satisfy
u(e —y,1) =u(e,0)
Aggregation across individuals may then be accomplished in the
mannersuggestedearlier andourprevious analysis applied. In par-
ticular, thematter of risk discounting may be examined as follows.
Supposethe markets for assets affordopportunities for riskless in—
vestments,i.e., there exist portfolios x satisfying
s—1,...,S ti I Z x a =q=t jisq
L0 otherwise
11Noticethat this general formulation recuires only that an individual
have a utility function ranking alternative consumptionprograms •This
is less restrictive than the von Neuman-Morgenstern formulation and
compatible with other approaches, e.g., the certainty-equivalence formu-
lation of Handa(1977).— 28—
fort1, ...,Q. (Ownershipof xreturnsa sure dollar at time t and
nothing at other times.) The existence of these riskiess portfolios
establishes the riskiess discount rates applicable to returns at time
tas
1/Cl + r)px t —1,...,Q
wherep(1, p1, •••p)is the vectorof timezerosure dollar—prices
of the assets. Now suposeanotherportfolio, x. offers risky returns
at time T, i.e.
rz5 — , ...,
Exa EII q—T sq
otherwise
The current market price of this risky portfolio must be px. This present
valuemayequivalently be determined by noting thattheratio px/pxT
representsthe price of theriskyportfolioin terms of tiuieTsure
dollars.This is the future,time T, value of the risky portfolio. To




Thus the present value of the risky portfolio is obtained by discounting
its future value at the riskiess rate. Again, this is the direct result— 29-
ofthe existence of markets which afford opportunities for riskiess invest-
ment.
Itshould be noticed that this analysis supposes only that free
competitive exchange is possible in the existing markets for assets.
Although this is notequivalent to assingthe existence of complete
contingentclaims markets itdoes include the case of complete markets
as a possible special case. To see thisnotice first thattheability
to buy and sellassets at prices
p (1, p1' '
impliesthat an individual endowed with the portfolio e faces the "port-
folio" budget constraint
px —pe
Suppose now that the rank of A is equal to SQ +1,i.e., there areas
manylinearly independent assets as there are types of contingent dollar
claims. Then we may write
x— A1C
andthe portfolio budget constraint is equivalent to the "contingent
claim" budget constraint given by
Pc —PE
where EAc and P pA1. Here the ability to buy and sellassets at- 30—
pricesp is equivalent to the ability to buy andsellcontingent claims
at prices P. This situation is therefore equivalent to onein which
completemarkets exist for trade in contingent claims. In general,
however, the rankofA maybeless thanSQ+1 in whichcaseexisting
marketsforassets do not provide opportunities for exchange of risk
equivalent to thosewhich would be afforded by a complete set of con—
tingentclaimsmarkets)2
12For a general discussion of therelationship of therankofthe assets
matrixto the opportunities for achieving efficient distributions of risk
see Ross (1976).APPENT)IX
Here we examine the relationships among the fair—bet, certainty and
surplus points defined in Section 2. The fair bet and certainty points
are closely related and may, in certain circtmtstances, coincide. Suppose,
for example, thatandare the same functional forms.
Then





+ 1) U (e - 1)
iff eqy =eD?D
In this case the certainty point and the fair bet point coincide. This
may also occur under more general circi.mstances as can be seen by making
use of the "ransom" approach developed in Cook and Graham (1977) and
defining R(e) by the requirement
(8) Ce —R(e),1) =
TJD(e, 1)
Notice that R represents the maximum amount an individualendowed with
acertainty of a dry year and dollarclairs ofe would pay toobtain aA- 2
certainty of a wet year. (R may either be positive or negative depending
upon whichstateispreferable.) ThusRrepresents a measure of the ex-
tent towhichthestate "wet" is in itself preferred to the state "dry"
(or vice versa). Differentiating both sides with respect to e we obtain
U Ce —1(e),1) (1— R'(e)] Ce, 1)
Now if R' Ce) is zero, i.e., there is no effect of a change in endowed
wealth upon the "ransom" the individual would pay,
then
Ce —R(e),1) = Ce,1)
In this case the certainty point andthefair bet point again coincide as
can be seen by letting e =eD
— andmaking use of equations C6), (7),
and (8). In general we may state that
(e —R(e),1) Ce, 1) as R'(e) 0
or that
U (e — 1)U (eD —',, 1)as R' (eD —
Thismeans that the fair bet point lies along the willingness to pay locus
tothe left or to the right of the certainty point depending upon whether
R'is positive or negative.A- 3
Turningnow to the surplus point we see that if
U (en, 0) UD (eD 0)
(thefarmer is endowed with claims thatleave him indifferent as to which
state,"wet" or "dry," occurs in the absence of the dam) then
U —SW,1) UD (eD —SD?1) (by equation 1)
and
(y, ) (sn, SD) (byequation 6)
Inthis case the certainty point and the surplus point coincide. In gen-
eral the surplus point lies along the willingness to pay locus to the
leftor to the right of thecertainty point depending upon whether "wet"
or"dry"ispreferred in the original endowment, i.e., upon whether
(eu, 0) UD (eD, 0)REFERENCES
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